John D. Dale Jr. advised Houston Hedges, deceased, to bring a forcible detainer under KRS 383. against Robert Hedges, after Robert filed the first installment of a statute lien under KRS 376. against the Hedges Farm to protect the investment of Robert Hedges from the immediate threatened theft of a D-4 Cat Dozer. The threat of the forcible detainer was made by the siblings of Robert Hedges, and Houston Hedges, not familiar with the law, and in-fact not in his right mind was swept along in the fast-paced flow of events as "a bruised reed in the wind. "

KRS 383.545 (15) Forcible detainer requires that Plaintiff must prove exclusive use and possession, and produce a bilateral signed rental contract. No contract was ever produced, nor was possession exclusive. Forcible detainer does not apply to Robert Hedges. Thus Dale violated Rule 11. - no basis in fact or law for suit.

The Hearing wherein the second Executrix was added to the estate was not in Court and was not with Notice to the Heirs. No objection was allowed to Ella Deitz. [ECHD] No Bond has been filed on this Estate. The Client of J. D. Dale, creator of the pseudo-documents used in 89-C-008 Forcible Detainer, became an Executrix, and J.D. Dale was still running up a tab.

Lien Papers filed in 89-C-008, 6p. Lien Bk. 6. pgs 485-495, 9pgs. These Lien Documents were tendered to the Bench, and filed as the Judge saw fit.

Council Dale tries to bolster his forcible detainer case with lies about destroyed inventories, interference with Executors, and the need to have the house vacant, as a contract is in the works to sell. Deft R. Hedges states that the personal property not of the Estate must be left alone and uninventoried (as a threat of arrest is filed in 89-C-008 by POA Holders/Executors.) Judge Stewart will not allow Deft to write explicit orders, and has Council Dale rewrite his vague cover-all-contingency orders.

89/8/1 = District Hearing . The forcible ruling against Robert is written causing the Appeal to Circuit in Case 89-X-002. No evidence has been presented that Robert was a tenant, had a signed lease, or had use and exclusive possession.

J. D. Dale has reasoned that the purpose of an Appraisal is :
1.- Inheritance Tax - $261,200. rather than $389,500. and counting. This defrauds the Commonwealth of Kentucky. [ see Response of J.D. Dale, KBA File # 2966 #7, pg. 4. ]

2.- " so a party would know how much to bid to cut off the owner's right of redemption." This places the Council in conflict of interest, fraudulent alienation, fraudulent concealment, fraudulent fppraisal, and possibly fraudulent conveyance. [ see Spencer Circuit 90-CI-0070, Plaintiff Motion dated 21 Feb. 1992 ]

$360,500 was the figures given to Robert after the Auction of 16 Mar. 1991, which coupled with the [unacceptable] Bid of $29,000. on the last 100 acres equals $389,500.
There appears to be a 49% discrepancy between the Appraisal and the cash offered/accepted/etc. (see KY Bar Complaint #2966)

Judge William Stewart was forced to "retire" from the 53rd Judicial Circuit in March 2005, by an investigation about his hiring his wife to work at the Court for him. Robert Hedges does not see this as such a significant infraction, because politics being what it is, a person surrounded by ambitious politically-oriented individuals with their own agendas to follow, must have real trused supportive persons close by. However, others say "this is feeding at the public trough" . At the same time, our state of KY has a scandal about the Republican administration placing loyal republican supporters in state jobs. This following many years of the democrats dominating job placement, democrats gaining seniority and democrats completely controlling many count courts. Looks like turnabout is fair play to me. Again others say ""this is feeding at the public trough". I pose to you a question - If the public trough is policed so well to protect us from political favors being given from it, where will politicians get favors to give supporters? I say " they will do dirty little land deals like this Hedges Estate right here, and they will claim "immunity".
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in Cuiksa v City of Mansfield, 250 F2d 700 (6th 1957) that the 6th didn't follow Pickens v Penn RR, 151 F2d 240, (3rd 1945) but felt Tenney v Brandhove, 341 US 367 (1951) was "controlling". Tenny states that legislators have immunity from suit for official acts. Tenney is quite good as long as the fact set of Tenney is distinguished from all other fact sets. That is " apples aren't called oranges". Legislators must cultivate broad cooperation to pass any legislation, and this is their discretionary task. If they in unison pass a bill that is void for vagueness, overbroad, or constitutionally impermissible, that "public law' can be attacked in Federal Court. However, if a judge (acting alone as a despot) passes a "private law" violating the constitutional rights of one person or family, Tenney cannot be controlling. And in fact unless that "private law" is assailable in the same Federal Court, as an action to clarify the violation on the limit of discretion, no case even distantly half-similar to Tenney could be "controlling". There is an absence of a thought process here. There is the attitude that "all should have immunity" and when some despot or some judge duped by local court interests uses a private law to bestow favors on political cronies, some courts would incorrectly say " it's too bad". " Pay protection. Pay more to lawyers. "
Anyone familiar with how the Mob works knows that when a mobster demands "protection money" from a businessman, the only solution is to get an equally or more influential mobster to have a "sit down" to protect that businessman. And then you have the FROG AND THE SCORPION.
The Court must be prepared to prevent individual despotic judges from passing unlawful private laws requiring extortionary and ruinous legal fees, which are the political favors to local political persons. These events should be seen as at least as important as public trough-feeding.
One group wants to say "it's state action - we cannot do anything about it" The other group wants to say " it's not state action - so we cannot do anything about it". In that case, you should be able to sue both bunches at once and make them explain to one another that it is or that it's not state action. There are some really good rulings from the past, well reasoned, clear, and then muddled recent attempts like the desire to broadly apply Tenney. We need to return to discretion as the singular basis for immunity.

================================================================= Interest due upon the outstanding portion of the Lien is as listed; Interest is a nominal 10% per annum compounded quarterly.